30 August 2023
ロータリークラブの皆様、初めまして。
オーストラリア大使のジャスティン・ヘイハーストと申します。
I start by thanking the Rotary Club of Tokyo, including:
- Mr Chikushi Katsumaro, Rotary Club President
and - Dr Greg Story
for hosting me today.
It is an honour to be here; I am grateful for your attendance.
Today I will set out the Australian Government’s agenda in, and with, Japan.
I detect real momentum in our engagement and a stronger-than-ever commitment in Japan to partnership with Australia.
A partnership that is valuable not only to our countries but also to regional stability and to shaping the rules and institutions that underpin economic and technological exchanges.
The opportunities for both nations lie in greater, deeper, more integrated cooperation, whether in defence, foreign policy, energy transition or advanced technology and data.
At the same time, risks to Australia’s and Japan’s interests have intensified in recent years – as has the uncertainty of our strategic and economic outlook.
I have described in other forums how, in Australia’s view, the international order is being reshaped, and the stability of the Indo-Pacific region can no longer be assumed.
This stability had for many decades been based on a combination of unchallenged American power, the growing integration of market-based economies, and a broad consensus that globalisation reinforced security interests.
That picture is changing.
We know that the world we live in looks different and requires new thinking and joint action to influence.
China’s growing power, weight and reach is the biggest and most consequential change, and it is still unfolding.
Strategists in Australia and Japan have long worried about how China uses its strength – to exert expansive maritime claims with no basis in international law for example.
Business and government leaders also have to consider what possible economic weakness in China might mean for their interests.
The point is China’s actions have systemic effects, often disruptive ones, on the global economy, on the world’s energy transition, in commodity markets and on the balance of power.
We now face a contested environment, in which democracies like Japan and Australia work together and with others to promote an alternative vision of the regional and global order to that pursued by China and its closest partner, Russia.
It’s a competition over power, values, rules, data, supply chains, and the technologies that link countries and economies.
Against that background, governments have choices about their approach to the world.
To adapt, to hedge, to hide or to act.
Australia has decided to approach the moment with ambition and activism.
The concept of agency is fundamental to Australia’s foreign policy as our Foreign Minister, Penny Wong, has said:
We can’t just leave it to the big powers to decide our fates.
And we cannot be passive when big powers flout the rules.
We are more than just supporting players in a grand drama of global geopolitics, on a stage dominated by great powers.
It is up to all countries to ask ourselves how can we each use our national power, our influence, our networks, our capabilities, to avert catastrophic conflict?
A similar description – of the ambitious and active use of power, networks, and influence - is true for Japan.
For example, as Chair of the G7 this year and in its bilateral and trilateral engagement with the Republic of Korea.
Of course, even in geopolitics, there is much more to the story than China.
The full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s nuclear sabre rattling are two of the starkest negative trends, but there are many others, including the DPRK’s illegal and threatening conduct towards its neighbours, including Japan.
The creeping normalisation of a might is right approach – including in the maritime domain - erodes stability and hard-won principles of international law.
Military intimidation, economic coercion and disinformation remain go-to tools in the armoury of authoritarian statecraft.
Japan is confronting disinformation as we speak that is targeting the release of treated water from Fukushima.
Australia has full confidence in Japan’s process backed by the expert nuclear science advice of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
We stand in solidarity with Fukushima and other prefectures recovering from the disaster.
These trends have demanded a response from Australia and from our partners, including from Japan, our special strategic partner.
There is the growing purpose and momentum of the Quad, which delivered important outcomes in health security, emerging technology and maritime domain awareness when leaders met in Hiroshima in May this year.
There is the record level of Australian assistance to, and engagement with, Pacific Island countries, including on climate change.
Australia is deepening partnerships with India, Indonesia and many others in Southeast Asia.
As well as delivering with Japan a Joint Declaration of Security Cooperation, which I will come back to later.
Australia has also joined Japan and others outside NATO in assisting Ukraine to defend itself against Russia’s illegal aggression.
This coherent and unified response to the danger posed by the war illustrates the power of partnership.
In addition to all of these actions, Australia is undertaking the largest single defence capability uplift in its history to deliver nuclear-powered submarines in partnership with the United States and United Kingdom.
This is a proportionate and responsible increase in military capability that reflects the extent and complexity of Australia’s maritime interests in a deteriorating security environment.
Australia is also developing long-range strike capabilities, the ability to produce munitions and is upgrading military bases in northern Australia.
One of these bases, Tindal, has just hosted aircraft and personnel from Japan’s Self-Defense Force, today followed by the two air forces returning to Japan to train together under Exercise Bushido Guardian.
Both activities are taking place under a new reciprocal access agreement, Japan’s first with any nation.
Australia’s decisions about defence strategy and capability are about deterrence so that we avoid a situation in which any country thinks that they can dominate another by the use of force or coercion.
In the words of our foreign minister: ‘we must ensure that no state ever concludes that the benefits of conflict outweigh the risks’.
And this objective is embedded in a policy that aims for strategic balance where strategic reassurance through diplomacy is underwritten by military deterrence.
A point made in Tokyo last year by Australia’s Deputy Prime Minister, Richard Marles:
Like Japan, Australia does not place a premium on military power as a tool of strategy. Australia will place its primary focus on diplomacy, economic openness and upholding rules. Working with our regional partners in the Pacific, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and the Quad.
This is a vital point about Australia’s approach – where defence is only one arm of statecraft - something we share with Japan.
The words of Japan’s Prime Minister bear repeating: “diplomacy needs to be backed by defence capabilities.”
Japan is a model and a regional leader, even allowing for its unique legal and historic circumstances.
It is pursuing a record defence spend, a transformation in systems and readiness within a Free and Open Indo-Pacific policy that primarily focuses on support for international law and connectivity.
In this strategy, transparent development financing is as important as defence capabilities.
You need both, one to deliver development and opportunity, the other to guard against, that is to deter, conflict and aggression.
Japan’s response to our current strategic circumstances demonstrates the necessity of deterrence and military preparedness, as well as the reinforcing need to compete economically and technologically in an order based on agreed rules.
Australia and Japan share an interest both in the balance of power and in the principles by which power is exercised so we can create an open regional order that has China prominent but not dominant.
To deliver a world where the rules – whether they govern trade or the maritime domain, or the environment or military engagement – are clear, mutually negotiated and consistently followed.
To that end, Australia and Japan are in a foreign policy partnership
to shape, build and connect.
With that strategic context in mind, I want to set out what I think of as three pillars of our partnership.
One is strategic coordination, as we have been discussing.
To implement our 2022 Joint Security Declaration and its commitments to an open, secure maritime domain, to international rules, to deterring aggression and its statement that:
We will consult each other on contingencies that may affect our sovereignty and regional security interests, and consider measures in response.
This agenda is about better integrating systems and policies, as well as developing greater levels of interoperability, including pursuing opportunities for joint exercises and shared capability development.
Our respective goals won’t be achieved without a greater level of integrated effort.
So, pillar one encompasses strategic coordination, deterrence, and inter-operability.
To marshal and pool our resources for shared objectives.
This approach between Australia and Japan we can also see in:
- our respective alliances with America
- our partnerships with India and the ROK
- our support for peace and security in the Taiwan Strait
- our work to support the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
- and our cooperation to respond to the development and security priorities of Pacific Island countries.
Pillar two is our vital trade, investment, and net zero partnership.
This pillar includes not only energy and food but also crucial inputs into Japanese manufacturing and wealth creation such as copper, nickel, zinc and aluminum, sugar and wheat.
There are opportunities in medical devices, services and defence industry as well significant potential for increased research collaboration.
According to the Herbert Smith Freehills 2022 investment report, Japan continues to rank second only to the United States in terms of cumulative foreign direct investment into Australia (A$133.8 billion) and fourth in combined foreign direct investment plus portfolio investment (A$258.7 billion).
Two-way trade between Australia and Japan was valued at A$117.3 billion in Australian FY2021-2022, making Japan Australia’s second-largest trading partner and second-largest export destination at A$92.9 billion.
This amounted to a 75 per cent increase in two-way trade compared to Australian FY2020-2021.
Our partnership in energy security – so vital to Japan – will need to evolve to become a strategic partnership on decarbonisation and clean energy given our respective net zero commitments.
As Australia’s Climate and Energy Minister, Chris Bowen, said in July: the[re is] opportunity for large Japanese traditional energy companies investing in Australian renewable energy.
We have no shortage of sun in Australia, nor a shortage of wind.
But we have always been hungry for more capital.
We welcome the investment in renewable energy from domestic firms, from multi-nationals.
We welcome it from renewable only companies and from fossil fuel companies diversifying and making the transition to renewables.
Japanese investment in gas has helped create this sector for Australia and a source of energy security for Japan.
And in the same way, Japan and Australia's partnership and investment in renewable energy can help both our countries meet our energy needs and emissions targets.
Riding through the disruption the energy transition entails will be assisted by the strategic trust both governments share.
And it is underpinned by an enduring commitment to Australia supporting Japan’s energy security, though we know the energy mix - what Japan imports and consumes - will change.
Gas for certain for years to come, but also hydrogen and other clean energy technologies.
The energy transition of course also has a strategic dimension.
Both Australia and Japan are supporting the energy transition in Asia and beyond.
We are also working to create viable markets for the supply of critical minerals to support battery-making and other technologies.
Australia has the endowments and mining and processing expertise.
Japan has the capital, technology and demand.
We need to combine these elements to develop the resilient supply chain our economic and security interests demand.
The economic dimensions of our partnership rely above all on well-functioning markets and capital mobility.
Both countries champion rules-based trade.
But we also need to tackle the security risks and distortions which flow if we over-rely on one supplier for critical technologies and inputs or one market for our exports.
So, pillar two is about our deep bilateral economic linkages, especially in energy, with growing and diverse opportunities in other sectors .
How we work under this pillar relies on more that what we do together.
It depends also on having a stable, law-based, institutionally sound economic environment in which we can trade, invest and innovate with confidence.
The third pillar on which we focus is that of the connections between both nations, including those pursued by Rotary Clubs in both countries.
Here we don’t want to admire past achievements, but rather work to ensure our people and societies know and understand each other even better.
One way the Australian Government will be looking to bring the second and third pillars of our relationship together will be our participation in the 2025 Osaka Expo.
We need also to look at new initiatives to make it even easier for Australians and Japanese to benefit from travel, study, research and work across our borders.
All told this is a busy and ambitious agenda.
We are doing more, doing it faster and doing it in partnership more than ever before.
The actions we are taking, individually and in partnership, are necessary but we recognise they occur at a time of uncertainty.
Among other things, for Australia that means seeking to keep lines of communication open to China while building deterrence and resilience.
Like Prime Minister Kishida’s policy to have stable and constructive relations with China, we also seek dialogue with China to find areas where we cooperate with China where we can, disagree where we must, and act in the national interest.
These remarks show, I hope, how Australia has responded with purpose and determination to the circumstances we face.
And how indispensable our partnership with Japan has become.
Foreign Minister Wong describes our partnership as committing:
‘both countries to expanding and strengthening cooperation across defence, intelligence, energy transition, climate change, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, health security, maritime security and economic security’.
In other words, to using all the tools at our disposal to secure our objectives.
Recent history has shown Australia and Japan have built a partnership that enjoys both economic and strategic complementarity.
When we work together, we deliver results that serve our interests and those of the Indo-Pacific region.
Thank you.